COMPARE

Compare promise with practice

Follow 2 questions from stated aims through institutional design and observed practice. This comparison does not score a winner or treat one Swedish case as proof of a universal system.

Did the design deliver what its advocates sought?

Question	What advocates sought	How the institution was designed	What happened in practice	What the evidence supports
Who would gain ownership and influence?Distribution	attributed value The enacted proposal sought more even wealth distribution and greater wage-earner influence through co-ownership while also supporting pensions and capital formation. Claim reviewed Swedish Government, 1983sections 2.1–2.3 · supports	observation Five government-appointed AP-system boards invested payroll- and profit-tax receipts under statutory funding, ownership, and listed-company voting caps. Claim reviewed Swedish Government, 1983sections 2.2–2.3 and proposed statutes · supports	observation By 1991 the funds held about 2.6 percent of exchange value and never became controlling owners. Claim reviewed Rikard Westerberg, 2023pp. 1025–1031 · supports	editorial interpretation The arrangement created collective capital holdings, but the evidence shown here does not establish a comparable transfer of controlling ownership or a broad reduction in private wealth concentration. Claim reviewed Swedish Government, 1983sections 2.1–2.3 · context Rikard Westerberg, 2023pp. 1025–1031 · supports
How would delegated power remain accountable?Accountability	attributed value The enacted proposal sought more even wealth distribution and greater wage-earner influence through co-ownership while also supporting pensions and capital formation. Claim reviewed Swedish Government, 1983sections 2.1–2.3 · supports	observation Five government-appointed AP-system boards invested payroll- and profit-tax receipts under statutory funding, ownership, and listed-company voting caps. Claim reviewed Swedish Government, 1983sections 2.2–2.3 and proposed statutes · supports	observation The funds generally acted as diversified long-term investors and did not pool holdings or seek company-board control. Claim reviewed Rikard Westerberg, 2023pp. 1021–1030 · supports	editorial interpretation Appointed and statutorily capped boards created investment capacity while leaving distinct questions about wage-earner representation, contestability, and electoral durability. Claim reviewed Swedish Government, 1983section 2.3.4 · supports Swedish Government, 1991proposal summary and sections 2–3 · qualifies

Why no score? Distribution and accountability ask different questions and rest on stated assumptions. Evidence about one cannot silently answer the other.

COMPARE AUTHORITY

How much voting authority did each arrangement provide?

Collective wage-earner shareholding authority: The legally permitted and practically exercised capacity of a collective wage-earner shareholding institution to vote corporate shares, distinguished by whether that authority is absent, capped below control, uncapped but noncontrolling, or capable of control.

AbsentNo collective wage-earner shareholding institution holds corporate voting authority in the stated scope.
Capped minorityThe institution may vote shares, but a binding cap prevents a controlling stake in any covered firm.
Uncapped minorityThe institution holds a noncontrolling stake without a binding rule that fixes it below control.
Potential controlThe institutional design permits collective voting holdings to reach control of a covered firm.

Bounded subject	Placement	Basis and scope	Uncertainty	Evidence
Enacted fund-board period, 1984–1991	Capped minority	case observation 1984–1991 · Sweden · The five enacted regional fund boards during their operating episode.	High confidence in the statutory cap and noncontrolling outcome; this placement does not establish how much effective influence the funds exercised within that cap.	observation Five government-appointed AP-system boards invested payroll- and profit-tax receipts under statutory funding, ownership, and listed-company voting caps. Claim reviewed Swedish Government, 1983sections 2.2–2.3 and proposed statutes · supports observation The funds generally acted as diversified long-term investors and did not pool holdings or seek company-board control. Claim reviewed Rikard Westerberg, 2023pp. 1021–1030 · supports observation By 1991 the funds held about 2.6 percent of exchange value and never became controlling owners. Claim reviewed Rikard Westerberg, 2023pp. 1025–1031 · supports
Liquidation-board period, 1992	Absent	case observation 1992 · Sweden · The immediate liquidation-board episode after abolition of the five fund boards.	High confidence that the five wage-earner fund boards had ended; residual asset administration is outside this dimension unless it retained collective wage-earner voting authority.	observation The incoming center-right government abolished the boards at the turn of 1991–1992. Claim reviewed Swedish Government, 1991proposal summary and sections 2–3 · supports

Bounded subject

Placement

Basis and scope

Uncertainty

Evidence

Enacted fund-board period, 1984–1991

Capped minority

case observation

1984–1991 · Sweden · The five enacted regional fund boards during their operating episode.

High confidence in the statutory cap and noncontrolling outcome; this placement does not establish how much effective influence the funds exercised within that cap.

observation

Five government-appointed AP-system boards invested payroll- and profit-tax receipts under statutory funding, ownership, and listed-company voting caps.

observation

The funds generally acted as diversified long-term investors and did not pool holdings or seek company-board control.

observation

By 1991 the funds held about 2.6 percent of exchange value and never became controlling owners.

Liquidation-board period, 1992

Absent

case observation

1992 · Sweden · The immediate liquidation-board episode after abolition of the five fund boards.

High confidence that the five wage-earner fund boards had ended; residual asset administration is outside this dimension unless it retained collective wage-earner voting authority.

observation

The incoming center-right government abolished the boards at the turn of 1991–1992.

Method

Classify a bounded subject from its formal voting-rights design, then qualify that placement with observed holdings and practice. Do not infer effective workplace control from share ownership alone.

Analytical choices

The scale describes corporate voting authority rather than judging whether collective ownership is desirable.
A legal cap and practical exercise are considered together, while board appointment, workplace participation, and economy-wide ownership concentration remain separate questions.

Limits

The dimension does not measure direct worker participation, government appointment power, investment performance, or the distribution of beneficial ownership.
Categories are specific to collective shareholding institutions and should not be generalized to an economy or political system.

This scale describes; it does not judge. These positions describe bounded voting authority. They do not say whether that authority was desirable, accountable, effective, or sufficient. Subjects without evidence remain unplaced—not halfway along the scale.