From Marxist Venture to Venture Capitalists

CLAIM CONNECTIONS / 6

Where this source is used

• The arrangement created collective capital holdings, but the evidence shown here does not establish a comparable transfer of controlling ownership or a broad reduction in private wealth concentration.

  • supports · pp. 1025–1031

• By 1991 the funds held about 2.6 percent of exchange value and never became controlling owners.

  • supports · pp. 1025–1031

• The enacted compromise pursued several social-democratic aims but materially constrained the ownership-transfer mechanism, so it is a partial and contested instantiation rather than an embodiment of social democracy.

  • qualifies · pp. 1014–1037

• The funds generally acted as diversified long-term investors and did not pool holdings or seek company-board control.

  • supports · pp. 1021–1030

• The enacted funds pursued collective ownership and wage-earner influence through investments in a continuing market economy, connecting them to economic democracy, social ownership, and market-socialist thought without fully realizing any one of those broad concepts.

  • qualifies · pp. 1014–1037

• Evidence about five Swedish fund boards operating from 1984 through 1991 cannot establish how socialist institutions would work in other places or show that this contested social-democratic program represents socialism broadly.

  • context · pp. 1014–1037